Engaging The Muslim Brotherhood
This is cross-posted from my blog. I wanted to get some reaction from readers here on the issue of increased engagement from of the MB on behalf of Western governments.
In keeping with a similar theme to a previous post of mine, I thought this report by Joshua Stacher was worth a small write-up. Some may remember his article published last year in the Boston Globe along with Samer Shahata arguing that in light of the Brotherhood’s electoral successes, a policy of engagement is warranted. The attitudes towards the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in the West are beginning to change, and despite some long-held reservations about the group Western governments seem to be opening up to the idea of responsible engagement with a major Islamist force in the region.
While I generally have little problem with the notion of talking to the Muslim Brotherhood, a change from the current prevailing policy of non-engagement would not come without its share of implications. Firstly, as Stacher makes note of in his report, there are many ‘grey areas’ surrounding the MB. These include “political pluralism,the use of violence, the principles of equal citizenship and universal human rights, and the relationship between religion and state.” Yet with this acknowledgement two policy recommendations are made concerning the relationship of Western governments towards the MB. What I find laudable about these recommendations is that they are presented in the context of the Egyptian political landscape as a whole. While I can’t find the paper to link to right now, I have argued in the past that while increased engagement of the countries’ theocrats is warranted, it should not come at the expense of Egypt’s other political factions, no matter how ineffective they have proven to be. In other words, the West should not embolden the theocrats at the expense of the democrats in the country, who equally have not been given a fair playing field to run their political activities. Stacher presents his recommendations in this context, one which I think is missing at times in other analyses of Western policy towards the MB.
The two recommendations are essentially that the West should increase its pressure on the Egyptian government for political reform which would allow for plurality in the system, while increasing efforts to open up channels of communication between the country’s opposition parties, including the MB. According to the executive summary, a future report is in the works which will highlight some of the more critical aspects of these policy recommendations and their implications.
I am no fan of the Brotherhood, and will continue to have my reservations against the group. However a broader policy of communication with both the theocrats and democrats of Egypt’s political opposition, with care taken not to promote any particular group and stimulate the freedom political activity in the country, would be in the interest of the country as a whole.
You can download the entire report here.
Here is a previous post of mine over at MidEastYouth, in which I expressed some of my reservations towards the Muslim Brotherhood’s position as Egypt’s political opposition, with an important quote from Saad Eddin Ibrahim. I was arguing for an empowerment of the ’silent majority’ Ibrahim speaks of through conditional U.S aid to Egypt:
The fact of the matter is Egypt, and the regime ruling it is extremly dependant on U.S support, which they have maintained through the illusion of the Muslim Brotherhood as the main political opposition. Secular parties are banned from forming or even gathering, charged with fabricated accusations of crime and effectively marginalised, yet to much less media fanfare than news of Brotherhood members being arrested. This is not unintentional, and as democracy activist Saad Eddin Ibrahim said in a recent interview (asked about the Brotherhood being the largest opposition group (link):
We could not organize rallies, we could not organize marches or demonstrations because of emergency laws. Emergency laws have been in effect since 1981, since the assassination of President [Anwar] Sadat. So for the last 26 years, these emergency laws have prevented secularists from going out and organizing and mobilizing.
On the other hand, the Muslim Brothers have the mosques, and that is an advantage that is without design probably by the regime, but it has played in their favor. Meanwhile, I do not like to exaggerate their constituency because despite the fact that they have freer space to move in, still their share in the last Egyptian parliamentary election was 20 percent out of the 20 percent [of registered voters who actually voted]. So, 77 percent of the registered voters did not like to vote for them, nor to vote for the regime. And that is a 77 percent that I consider to be the silent majority, the potential constituency for liberal-democratic parties whenever liberal-democratic parties are allowed full freedom to operate.
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Wow, sit down and talk to the MB? That would be like mental masterbation wouldn’t it? From what I’ve read of their history, their role model is Adolph Hitler. One of his favorite tricks was to sit and talk until he was ready to strike. Then he kicked ass….can you say “Blitzkreig”? Other folk who have written discussions here have said that MB has gained much of it’s support with a soft soap sell, but has plans to install a clerical dictatorship simular to Iran’s. Do you really think discussion with these folks could really be productive….or just PHD (piled higher and deeper)?
Tonto,
I’d think so. I’m well aware of their history, and some of the most radical theologians have been part of the Brotherhood. However, they’ve been winning seats and have been functioning somewhat productively in parliament. The idea is to open up Egypt’s political landscape, in which I think other parties could beat the Brotherhood in free and fair elections over time. This involves then talking to Egypt’s opposition as a whole. What needs to be accepted is that the Brotherhood is part of that opposition. The new generation of the MB does not reflect its senior leadership I’d say.
With all these grey areas mentioned in the post, do you think it would be wise to ignore this group as it continues to rise in prominence? Talking does not necessarily mean agreeing, however a frank dialogue with the West may go a long way to eradicate some of the suspicions present on both sides. Or it may not but I don’t think it could hurt.
Karim, I agree with you that talking to the Muslim Brotherhood is probably a good idea, even though Tonto is probably right that we’re not going to get very far with them.
However, just opening up a dialogue with them, and with all the opposition groups, is a step in the right direction. Dialogue opens up new possibilities, and creates its own reality.
What is very important is to reach out to that 77% that you’re talking about. We have to compete for their hearts and minds using an approach that is similar to what the Muslim Brotherhood uses:
If the Brotherhood talks about an ideology of Jihad: We should talk about an Ideology of Common Sense.
If the Brotherhood invests in charitable handouts; We should invest some serious dollars in jobs.
If the Brotherhood sells a vision of hope for martyrdom, or paradise, or a cliphate; We should sell a Vision of Hope for Peace, Prosperity, and Freedom.
At every turn we should cut the extremists off at the pass, and beat them at their own game. In this manner, we will be able to marginalize the extremists in the eyes of their own people. The extremists will not be able to capture the public’s imagination, once people begin to imagine a better life for themselves.
Dialogue with the MB won’t reach the 77%. Everything Nissim suggested can be done without talking to the MB. In fact, the economic aid money that goes to Egypt from the US is supposed to help do exactly that.
On another note, my concern w/ dialogue w/ opposition groups is that some “opposition groups” are terrorist groups. I do not believe that the MBs are a terrorist orgazation, but the current US administration has classified them as such…until that classification changes, the dialogue should not happen, otherwise where would that end? Which terrorist groups are OK to talk to, which ones aren’t? That’s a slippery and dangerous slope.
However, specifically with the MB in Egypt, US gov’t officials have gotten around this because so many MBs are members of the Parliament. So, US officials meet with Egyptian Parliament members, instead of the US meeting w/ members of the MB (even though it’s the same thing).
Nissim,
I agree with your comment completly.
Jessica, as you point out, we pretend not to talk to the Brotherhood, but we end up doing it anyways, because many of their members are members of Parliament. So instead of being so surreptitious about it, why not be straight forward and talk directly to these people?
The same goes for Hamas. No one wants to talk to Hamas, but everybody agrees that Hamas is part of the equation.
This idea of not talking to people we don’t like is not working too well for the Bush administration. It is not a wise policy.
If you talk to these people, you may pursuade some of them of go your way. Or you might be able to get them to debate one another. Maybe internal divisions will surface that you could take advantage of. But even without that, your willingness to talk to them, could have a positive effect on those on the outside who are watching and listening.
A moderate who witnesses and hears the conversation between you and the extremists could conclude that you have a better argument, and may lean in your direction especially if you’re willing to back up your words with investment money on the table.
Hell, I’d even talk to al Qaeda itself if I could be relatively assured of not having my head served on a plate.
Nissim, excellent attitude! I really like your game plan for hope. Yep, head ‘em off at the pass! I really like it!
Thanks Tonto. I think it might must work. Now all we need are some investors who are willing to take somewhat of a gamble on peace. Keep a lookout for a few open-minded Saudis. If our sales pitch is good enough, who knows, they might just buy in. Stanger things have happened.