Third Revolution
Once there was a revolution in Iran, led by Ayatollahs, overthrowing Shah Regime and destabilizing the Island of Stability for more than a decade. That event not only led to a regime change but also transformed socio-cultural system of Iranian society. Ordinary people who had been directed toward a western life style during Shah Reign were then ready to embrace a fundamentalist, politically aggressive interpretation of Shiite Islam. Ayatollah Khomeini, charismatic founder of Islamic Republic, used to serve as a mentor for whose guides a better part of the society would sacrifice their belongings up to their lives. However, many moderate figures, including administration of Prime Minister Bazargan, were still active in then political atmosphere of Iran. Even though somehow isolated, they could affect some parts of the society and serve as a barrier to many radical decisions.
Almost one year later, there was the Hostage Crisis in Iran. It finally led to Bazargan’s resignation. Ayatollah Khomeini called the event the Second Revolution. He was right in the sense that Hostage Crisis helped radicalize Iran’s politics and put aside moderate figures. For years to come, the voice of hardliners was dominant in Iran.
After demise of Ayatollah Khomeini which coincided with the end of Iran-Iraq war, absence of a charismatic hardliner leader left some room for moderate voices to spread. Compared to Ayatollah Khomeini, the new supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, barely had the support of masses. In addition, technocrat, pragmatic administration of Ayatollah Rafsanjani, whose main rhetoric was Reconstruction, helped found a relatively strong middle-class whose main concerns hardly included those of founders of Islamic Revolution. The young grown up in that period of time, especially girls with their progressively loosening dress code, turned into the symbol of a generational gap.
No surprise that the new age did need Khatami, a reform candidate promising more freedom and less oppression. From the point of regime’s strategists, Khatami could serve as a safety tube, containing unrests, directing the discontent already available in the society toward less dangerous goals acceptable to senior officials of the regime. Presidents of Islamic Republic are usually supposed to serve two terms. Khatami was no exception.
Even though reform movement failed to bring about changes essentially needed to establish a western democracy, senior officials were reluctant to cope with it for another eight years. Had taken the power for another term, reformists and still-born civil society established in the age of reform could have turned into an existential threat. Moreover, reformists themselves paved the way for a new chapter to begin. The change masses demanded was not in parallel with what senior reformists tried to accomplish.
Khatami had to pass power to a new figure. A controversial election brought Ahmadinejad and Rafsanjani to the second round of the presidential election. Even though results of the first round were highly skeptical, Ahmadinejad beating his rival in the second round with a landslide was a clear sign of people demanding the change, again.
In his four years of presidency, Ahmadinejad convinced masses in rural and suburban areas that he should be the one. He gathered many supporters to whose tables were brought a portion of oil income. That fact led senior strategists of the regime to believe that the time was ripe for revenge.
Recent presidential election and its aftermath, whether a political coup or a failed velvet revolution, helped IRI officials put aside moderate figures who were mostly born in the age of Reconstruction and flourished in the age of Reform. In other words, this election helped radicalize Iran’s politics. In this sense, had he been able to send a message, Ayatollah Khomeini would have called Ahmadinejad’s reelection the Third Revolution.
Join the Conversation
Thank you so much. Such a concise and articulate history that puts so much into perspective!
You know Mohammad, i think not just Islamic Republic , but also Iranian society itself, needed such a thing to survive and tolerate the system. System in that traditional way, with those traditional politicians can no longer work for Islamic Republic.
Nejad’s political language doesnt seem much traditional radicalism to me really, but either a “new” language, breaking some more taboos and stereotypes of the Iranian political arena and Iranian society. His political way is new, he doesnt copy anybody, but rather other political figures copied his and others’ previous vows in this election. (like using the poverty word or Obama’s vows and ways for example)
Nejad might have a beard, but he kisses hands of his female teacher and he claims to allow women for going to stadium for watching Soccer, appoints not much religious Mashaei and so many ‘tranditional’ Qum’s religious figures -if i dont say 80%- are against him and avoided to congratulate him for his second term of victory.
They’re all paradoxes been neglected with what’s induced in minds about Radicalism. I can not convince myself that he is really following the radicalism of 70s and 80s.
I do not reject the idea that Nejad has had supporters in the rural areas, but am not also sure that all moderate figures have been put aside though. Since average age of Iranians is 27 years old, it might be true that both groups, whether Nejad or Mousavi, attracted the youth generation.
Many “young” educated people voted for Nejad and some of them are not religious at all, nor rural and radical. They are also from the moderates, they dont like the mandatory Hijab, they’re agaist the violence that happened lately and in the past. However they’ve faced some more “radical and stereotypical reactions” from some reformist youth.
They just voted for Nejad for they assume he will fight the corruption and he is the one for the real “change” in the social structure. Now whether right or wrong, We shall wait and see how much they were true..
However, with all dicussions around election, there’s a point that no longer “Tehranis” decide for the rest of Iranians. As a Tehrani woman, with non-persian background, i’ve noticed that Iranian ethnic groups have been under abusement of the Tehrani Persians and they would surrender to what Tehrani culture would impose. Tehran used to decide what people wear, eat and whom they should vote for. (I might write about it in another post)
If we take the idea that election result was fair, it seems that non-tehranis gained their pride to decide on their own.
Before that, we used to predict the result of election from Tehran’s result. But this election showed that Tehran is no longer considered as all Iran.
Nejad has a stinging lanauge, a greed for power and more power and he doesn’t hide his total alignment with Russia despite all what we have lost in the Northern region at all. He is the magnified nightmare for this restless nation who have struggled most for independ4ence and liberty through the ages and gained so little, but the scent of liberty is in the air….
In a previous post, Lord Kavi said that Iranians know what they don’t want, but don’t know what they do want.
I think that may well be the case, as born out by some of your analysis Mohammad. The people may be frustrated, for example, by the economic situation, or at the way Iran is perceived internationally. The anger swells within them, especially among the young people, and they lash out with their votes, or in the streets. However, it they don’t have a clear idea of what it is that they do want, then the chances for new leadership to emerge which will address the needs of the people are slim, because the people themselves don’t have a handle on what their needs really are.
What is called for here, in my opinion, is a charismatic leader who has a clear vision of where the country has to go to meet the needs and aspirations of the people. That vision should be sold to the man on the street, so that the will of the people is in sync with the intentions of the leadership.