Given the narrow margin of her loss to President-elect Obama during the Democratic primaries and the support she still holds among the public and her party’s top brass, her involvement in an Obama administration seemed to be there for the taking if she so desired. Clinton is currently considered the front-runner for the position on a short-list that includes the familiar faces of Senator John Kerry and Former U.N ambassador Bill Richardson. How would the appointment of Hillary Clinton to the Secretary of State affect U.S policy on the Middle East?

Beside running the State Department, the Secretary of State traditionally serves the President as his chief foreign policy advisor. The nature of this role has had exceptions; during the Cold War, depending on the administration, the top foreign policy advisor was sometimes the Secretary of State or the National Security Advisor. In recent times it could be argued that the Vice President’s office has played an enlarged role in the formation of foreign policy. The Secretary of State plays a few other roles in foreign affairs, including the handling of negotiations with foreign governments and their representatives, and the marketing of U.S foreign policy to the rest of the world. Given the presence of Vice President Joe Biden (not my favorite policy architecht, but knowledgable nonetheless), and the possible involvement of Samantha Power in the next administration (an academic and a prominent writer, she’s been widely tapped for the position of National Security Advisor), Clinton’s influence on Obama in matters of foreign affairs may be limited. Further influence on Obama may be hampered by their reportedly contentious relationship stemming from the Democratic primaries. Hillary Clinton’s selling ability however, given her public stature, could be well suited to the position.

Of what we can derive from her presidential run, Clinton’s foreign policy views are nearly identical to those of Obama. Beside the standard campaign rhetoric on Iraq (both want to see a withdrawal of U.S presence, but both are cautious of how this would proceed) and Afghanistan (the first of the individual Wars on Terror is likely to receive a renewed focus in the coming four years), we have little to glean from either of their foreign policy objectives other than an increased emphasis on multilateralism and probably a more realist approach to exercising American power abroad. Compare their Foreign Affairs articles, for instance, written toward the end of 2007. While they generally reek of the traditional ambiguity of a political stump speech, their essays reflect the democratic line on foreign policy, perhaps only separated by their distinct emphasis’ on themes of experience and judgment that served to anchor their campaign messages. The possible points of contention emerge on discussions of approaching Iran, with Clinton seeming rhetorically less-open to high level negotiations with the Islamic Republic that have been proposed by Obama. While their policy differences on Iran are minute, Clinton’s emphasis during the primaries on setting ‘pre-conditions’ before engaging the Iranians (which is already happening) managed to pull Obama’s conciliatory language toward the center on the issue, dropping suggestions that he would meet with Ahmadinejad (a rather pointless endeavor to propose in the first place, given where real power on Iran’s foreign policy is centered).

Clinton does carry some light baggage with respect to Iran. During an interview with ABC news toward the end of her presidential run, she responded to a question about the possibility of Iran attacking Israel with nuclear weapons with this statement:

“I want the Iranians to know that if I’m the president, we will attack Iran. In the next 10 years, during which they might foolishly consider launching an at tack on Israel, we would be able to totally obliterate them.”

Iran protested formally to the U.N, and Iranian members of parliament responded to the provocation with typical indignation and resentment. While protests to the comment are more symbolic than anything else (similar comments have been made by others throughout the past 8 years), reputation is an integral factor in diplomacy and negotiation, and her efforts to engage Iran may receive a sour reception from an already reluctant political establishment in that country.

Any appointee to the position will be responsible for executing an ambitious agenda challenged by a weakened base of resources and power. The familiar obstacles of Israel-Palestine, MidEast political reform, Iraq, Iran, and Syria-Lebanon require a determined yet pragmatic approach to overcome. With all the talk of Senators and former presidential candidates being considered for the job, one cannot help but wish that more established, wonky foreign affairs experts would be short listed to head the U.S state department. A ceremonial appointee (which Clinton and Kerry would largely be) could serve to draw increased attention to their efforts, but wouldn’t it be more appropriate to appoint a person specialized in foreign affairs or diplomacy to head America’s foreign policy bureaucracy? I’m skeptical of the short-list, but almost any appointee will carry out a similar agenda with regard to the Middle East.

One of the most compelling contrasts offered to us throughout this past election cycle has been the manner in which an exuberant optimism has been met with cautious skepticism. In a debate held in Maastricht’s ravishing Selexyz bookshop on the night of the election, Danny Merideth, a political advisor to the U.S ambassador to the Netherlands, suggested the tempering of expectations held of an Obama administration. Similarly, other members of the debate panel were quick to point to the difficulties that an Obama administration would face in pursuing its ambitious agenda. The restrictions Barack Obama will face are certainly true of any incoming president; a newly-elected chief executive must deal with their predecessors’ budget, is likely to honor the military and trade agreements already established, and must deal with the challenges posed by the international system, in this case two wars and a commitment to fighting terrorism. Add to that the mounting financial crisis, and it may be easy to understand why reality could weaken the winds powering the sails of an incoming administration that has charted a path paved with hope and headed toward significant change.

It would be prudent of us, however, to step back and cautiously monitor the doubts we express of next four years, in lieu of the history that was made on November the 4th; a history that is likely to litter the pages of history books written for generations to come. Watching the reaction to Barack Obama’s victory that night, both here in Maastricht and around the globe, I was reminded of another culturally significant movement that reshaped the image of the United States both within and outside the nation. In 1969, a concert featuring the days’ most prominent rock and roll artists took place in a small suburb of New York. Woodstock, as the event would come to be known, was as significant for the unification of a generation as the peace and love which it exuded. In the only documentary produced on the event, its director Michael Wadleigh managed to capture images of a youth compelled to unity, inspired by potential and motivated by the questionable actions of its government. One can only imagine the narrative with which history will portray Obama’s victory, as well as the screaming crowds that followed his march to the White House and celebrated his arrival.

The projection of unity in this election, spanning a globe that has grown weary of the exploits of the world’s unipolar, may have far superseded that of the Woodstock generation. This unity is likely to stand distinct in its historicity, and may well prove to be a potent currency with which an Obama administration will act to meet the global challenges of the next four years. What follows are four reasons why this election is probable to affect significant change on the world’s future, and why in addition to tempering our expectations and hopes, we may want to constrain our skepticism.

The Significance of Ethnicity/Race

The shade of Barack Obama’s skin, while tempting to write-off as insignificant to the way he will run the United States in his upcoming term, is significant, and not only because of the racial progress it is symbolic of. While writings in the vein of Christopher Hitchens’ and William Kristol’s have emerged throughout the election cycle suggesting the lack of importance a candidate’s black skin will have toward his administration’s policies and programs, I’d like to suggest otherwise. It was not Obama’s proposals on pursuing militants in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, nor his suggestion that an increased effort was required of the U.S’ allies in Europe to stabilize Afghanistan that prompted the support of millions from Gaza to Nairobi.

And while his international support cannot be solely explained away as stemming from his racial and ethnic identity, it has certainly proved a forceful magnet in attracting positive views of the United States. At a time when the favorability of the U.S, according to several Pew poll results, rarely exceeds the mark of 50% among developing nations, the election of an African American has reframed the narrative of the American dream. Obama’s election has strengthened the image of U.S democracy around the world, and has conjured up the imaginations of those people who live with an unfortunate reality of the lack of opportunity for success of this magnitude in their own countries. This has manifested itself into statements by heads of state praising the triumph of ethnic and racial tolerance; Afghanistan’s President Hamid Karzai suggested Obama’s election ushered in a “new era” in which politics would transcend race, color and ethnicity.

Although this mode of thinking may demonstrate the failure “to emancipate (ourselves) from the original categories of identity that acted as a fetter upon clear thought,” as Hitchens has noted, it is equally representative of the emotive response much of the world still holds toward racial and ethnic identity, and the important role it has and will play in changing the perceptions of the United States for the better.

The World Was Watching, and Obama Spoke To Them

Every election in modern history has been watched by the world, with differing degrees of interest. With the advent satellite television networks, the internet, and other tools of global communication, billions of people have been able to garner a nuanced appreciation of the U.S election process. While this writer may be too young to appreciate the attention paid to elections past, it should be safe to say that the support Obama has received overseas has been both impressive and unprecedented.

For almost two full years, the international community has been privy to an election held on the grandest and arguably most important stage of them all. Foreign newspapers, television newscasts, and websites were filled with coverage and opinion on the election from the moment Obama announced his run to his last speech declaring his victory. People outside the U.S expressed their views, hopes, and criticisms of the candidates; what’s significant is that a candidate spoke back to them.

Several of Obama’s speeches were sprinkled with messages to the world. After losing three of the first four primaries to Senator Hillary Clinton, Obama alluded to both the tone of his opponent’s campaign and the international attention surrounding it when he said “The world is paying attention to how we conduct ourselves. What will we they see? What will we tell them? What will we show them?” Similarly, on the night of his victory in the general election, in a speech given to over 125,000 people in attendance, Obama addressed his audience overseas:

“And to all those watching tonight from beyond our shores… our stories are singular, but our destiny is shared, and a new dawn of American leadership is at hand. To those who would tear this world down — we will defeat you. To those who seek peace and security — we support you.”

An International America?

Not to exaggerate the influence he will have or the transformative effect he’ll wield on the way U.S power is used, but the possibility for a more international America is at hand. That is not to suggest that the preeminence of American national security will fade, or that strategic interests will suddenly cease to be the primary motivator for U.S action around the globe. For all the talk of the Bush military doctrine and the wisdom of nation-building, much of what we’re likely to see in the next four years will be a continuation of the past eight. To his credit, Obama’s campaign for the presidency has managed to ooze exceptionalism without making his foreign spectators queasy.

However, amidst all that will stay the same, Obama is very likely to leave an indelible mark on American foreign policy. Of all the candidacies we’ve been exposed to throughout this election, his has been by far the most forward-thinking. Of particular interest to this writer is his counter-terrorism plan, audaciously named his “Plan to Defeat Terrorism”. And while that won’t happen, Obama’s plan stands out for the manner in which it details the role that communication will play in this endeavor. In an effort to shore up support for extremists, the plan mentions the importance of speaking directly to Muslim audiences, and training diplomats in media skills and foreign languages in order to provide an American presence on foreign satellite networks. As part of a large scale public diplomacy effort, Obama’s plan aims to build new “America Houses” that would serve as cultural centers in regions of the world where anti-Americanism is so fervent it may play a role in driving people toward extremist groups. The plan also makes mention of providing alternative options for education in countries where Islamic schooling, prone to the absorption of extremist thought, tends to dominate. Finally, he plans to double spending on U.S foreign aid by the end of his first term, setting a goal of $50 billion dollars.

Obama is Symbolic of a New Generation

‘The torch has been passed’ may have earned its official status as a cliché following election night, however it speaks to a large measure of truth. Barack Obama is very much a child of a ‘flattened globe’, to borrow a phrase from Thomas Friedman. Born to a mother from Kansas and a father from Kenya, having lived in Indonesia for four years as a child, and mingling almost exclusively with foreign students throughout his undergraduate years, Obama’s upbringing is one that forms a holistic, inclusive perspective on the world. Refreshing as that sounds, that perspective will serve not only as a pallet-cleanser to the last eight years; it has and will continue to draw more international attention to what he says and does.

It is conceivable that an international lobby may prove more capable of exerting some measure of influence on the presidency in the coming 4 years than it has been able to in the past eight. If that is the case, it will in large part be due to Obama’s time spent overseas. Why this is not a perennial requirement for the self-proclaimed leaders of the free world is beyond my understanding. I must say, however, I will be looking forward to an American president who can both relate and speak effectively to his generation and the generation to follow, as evidenced by a campaign that seemed to possess more awareness of the world around it than that of his opponent.

While the prospects for an Obama presidency may arguably be overrated, the next four years are likely to effect significant change on American leadership for reasons other than the departure of President Bush. We are likely to see America’s image reframed to appeal to the world, with a leader at its helm more willing to consider our appeals toward him. And although the chants of “yes we can”, the multi-colored Obama t-shirts adulating the man, and the prospects for disappointment may give cause to those cautioning the lowering of expectations, we should temper our skepticism to appreciate the change that has already come, and the promise it holds for our futures.

In keeping with a similar theme to a previous post of mine, I thought this report by Joshua Stacher was worth a small write-up. Some may remember his article published last year in the Boston Globe along with Samer Shahata arguing that in light of the Brotherhood’s electoral successes, a policy of engagement is warranted. The attitudes towards the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in the West are beginning to change, and despite some long-held reservations about the group Western governments seem to be opening up to the idea of responsible engagement with a major Islamist force in the region.

While I generally have little problem with the notion of talking to the Muslim Brotherhood, a change from the current prevailing policy of non-engagement would not come without its share of implications. Firstly, as Stacher makes note of in his report, there are many ‘grey areas’ surrounding the MB. These include “political pluralism,the use of violence, the principles of equal citizenship and universal human rights, and the relationship between religion and state.” Yet with this acknowledgement two policy recommendations are made concerning the relationship of Western governments towards the MB. What I find laudable about these recommendations is that they are presented in the context of the Egyptian political landscape as a whole. While I can’t find the paper to link to right now, I have argued in the past that while increased engagement of the countries’ theocrats is warranted, it should not come at the expense of Egypt’s other political factions, no matter how ineffective they have proven to be. In other words, the West should not embolden the theocrats at the expense of the democrats in the country, who equally have not been given a fair playing field to run their political activities. Stacher presents his recommendations in this context, one which I think is missing at times in other analyses of Western policy towards the MB.

The two recommendations are essentially that the West should increase its pressure on the Egyptian government for political reform which would allow for plurality in the system, while increasing efforts to open up channels of communication between the country’s opposition parties, including the MB. According to the executive summary, a future report is in the works which will highlight some of the more critical aspects of these policy recommendations and their implications.

I am no fan of the Brotherhood, and will continue to have my reservations against the group. However a broader policy of communication with both the theocrats and democrats of Egypt’s political opposition, with care taken not to promote any particular group and stimulate the freedom political activity in the country, would be in the interest of the country as a whole.

You can download the entire report here.

Here is a previous post of mine over at MidEastYouth, in which I expressed some of my reservations towards the Muslim Brotherhood’s position as Egypt’s political opposition, with an important quote from Saad Eddin Ibrahim. I was arguing for an empowerment of the ’silent majority’ Ibrahim speaks of through conditional U.S aid to Egypt:

The fact of the matter is Egypt, and the regime ruling it is extremly dependant on U.S support, which they have maintained through the illusion of the Muslim Brotherhood as the main political opposition. Secular parties are banned from forming or even gathering, charged with fabricated accusations of crime and effectively marginalised, yet to much less media fanfare than news of Brotherhood members being arrested. This is not unintentional, and as democracy activist Saad Eddin Ibrahim said in a recent interview (asked about the Brotherhood being the largest opposition group (link):

We could not organize rallies, we could not organize marches or demonstrations because of emergency laws. Emergency laws have been in effect since 1981, since the assassination of President [Anwar] Sadat. So for the last 26 years, these emergency laws have prevented secularists from going out and organizing and mobilizing.

On the other hand, the Muslim Brothers have the mosques, and that is an advantage that is without design probably by the regime, but it has played in their favor. Meanwhile, I do not like to exaggerate their constituency because despite the fact that they have freer space to move in, still their share in the last Egyptian parliamentary election was 20 percent out of the 20 percent [of registered voters who actually voted]. So, 77 percent of the registered voters did not like to vote for them, nor to vote for the regime. And that is a 77 percent that I consider to be the silent majority, the potential constituency for liberal-democratic parties whenever liberal-democratic parties are allowed full freedom to operate.

After watching ‘Fitna‘ yesterday, I wasn’t sure whether to post a reaction that night here on the blog. The film failed to move me either way. It was a series of images which we have all seen before, especially regular readers of blogs, while the only thing distinguishing it from a U.S presidential campaign ad was that Wilders’ argument is directed at the entire religion and not just at an identified radical strain.

Let’s face it, the film was boring. It didn’t live up to its hype. However now that it seems the initial reaction to the film was one of relief, it may very well shine the spotlight on Wilders’ argument. It is an argument that I do not believe can stand much scrutiny if considered honestly, and one that is not easily proven by a 15 minute film.

Of course, the IRI responded quickly. The Iranian Foreign Minister was quoted as saying “This heinous measure by a Dutch lawmaker and a British establishment … is indicative of the continuation of the evilness and deep vengeance such Western nationals have against Islam and Muslims.”

In Pakistan, a few demonstrations took place, none of them attracting over 100 people. The story still managed to make the IHT. Indonesia also issued a statement, saying:

“We are of the view that the film has a racist flavour and is an insult to Islam, hidden under the cover of freedom of expression,” a Foreign Ministry spokesman said. “We call on Indonesian people not to be incited.”

Once again, however, all this pales in comparison to reaction within Holland. I wrote this at the beginning of the month:

Yet what is worrying about this story is its’ propensity to attract judgment on the basis of foreign reaction. The movie’s release and broadcast may not necessarily stoke severe social tensions within the Netherlands, but looks bound to provoke an international reaction disproportionate to the issue itself. Religious leaders from Egypt and Syria have demanded the EU take action against those who insult religion, for example, bringing back into focus an increasingly familiar debate of cultural sensitivity versus freedom of speech.

I still think this story has a way to go before people forget about it, although it shouldn’t provide us with much more than increased calls for interfaith dialogue as well as the lowest common denominator protests we read about every so often. One hopes at least that we don’t see an exaggerated reaction to a movie that isn’t very offensive.

One may find it hard to argue with Obama on this point, as his candidacy has certainly alerted the world to a different face of American politics. Yet “the world” is an attentive place, and people are inclined to follow a story as much for its audacity to hope as its audacity to bully. One such story, which has had a development of outlandish proportions, is about the yet to be released movie “Fitna”. As I imagine most readers will already know, Dutch MP Geert Wilders’ 10 minute film is set to aggravate an already scrutinized Muslim population, both in his native country and around the world.

His film’s message is rather simple and has been made numerous times by the man himself: Islam is fascist, and the Qur’an incites violence of deadly proportions. Wilders’ insistence on making these points central to his political career has not come without personal cost; the man has had to leave his country for a period of time, travel with constant security surveillance, and even work out of a prison cell at one point in his life. According to some he has taken up the mantle of Theo van Gogh and Ayaan Hirsi Ali in Dutch politics, although he’ll tell you he’s been making these statements long before anyone began listening to him.

Wilders’ latest attempt at international infamy is one of precision and deliberation. While last year’s Muhammed caricatures inflamed cultural tensions well after their publication, the Dutch politician’s first cinematic venture has already managed to provoke significant reaction from officials of governments that are oft-labeled illegitimate and non-representative by their constituents. Iranian officials have threatened an economic embargo and the Egyptian foreign ministry has patronizingly lectured the Dutch government on free speech and responsibility. Never mind that neither of these suddenly defensive bodies retains any authority upon which to issue statements of responsibility. They have already played right into a game which has been designed to provide ideological vindication for its designer.

As the world reacts to his unreleased film, the bleach blonde-haired politician has seemingly taken it all in stride. “It’s not the aim of the movie but people might be offended, I know that. So what the hell? It’s their problem, not my problem,” Wilders remarked in a recent television interview with an American network. The statement is masked in unwavering bravado, although it does expose a flaw in his plan which could soon turn his native population fully against him. A recent poll revealed a majority of Dutch citizens in support of the film’s broadcast, while also wary of its consequences of the Netherlands’ international image and its relations with Arab nations:

The poll by TNS NIPO for RTL television showed that 54 percent thought the film should be broadcast although 76 percent expected it to increase tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims and 74 percent saw worsening relations with Arab nations.
The survey of 600 people conducted on February 29 showed that 68 percent expected a boycott like that seen against Denmark after cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed appeared in a Danish newspaper.

The Dutch government has taken exhaustive measures to distance itself from both the film and the politician, while cautioning that citizens and companies abroad could conceivably bare the brunt of Wilders’ actions. NATO’s secretary general has joined this chorus of vigilance, warning of the potential backlash on Dutch soldiers serving in Afghanistan. “If the [troops] find themselves in the line of fire because of the film, then I am worried about it and I am expressing that concern,” he said in a television interview. With the majority of Dutch citizens now siding with free-speech over outrage, it has been suggested that any significant backlash against their country as a result of the film could swing a tide of resentment directly at the leader of the Freedom Party.

“In Holland we have a tendency to underestimate the significance of some of our politicians’ actions,” remarked Thomas Luijken, an active member of the student political party NOVUM. “With Ayaan Hirsi Ali, whether you agree with her or not, we did not realize the impact she would have around the world.” When I asked him whether, after considering the controversy this film is being met with and the warnings of harm to Dutch interests overseas, he would be willing to take a stand either for or against Wilders, he responded resolutely. “If people protest overseas, that’s their right, unless they become riots and not protests. But if Dutch are negatively affected by this abroad and this results in some sort of violence, I would join a protest against (Wilders). It’s not a very Dutch thing to do, but if (a protest) happened I would join it.”

While this was one person’s reaction, it was emblematic of relative Dutch apathy to the issue. Although media outlets have obsessed over the story for weeks now, local Muslim groups and other offended parties have responded with arguments of legality and social sophistication. In the southern city of Maastricht, the areas’ largest mosque has held discussion nights opening its’ doors to all interested parties for a ‘respectful dialogue’. Others’ who feel slighted by the movie, and with Wilders himself, have sought legal action against the politician who was recently described as a ‘rising star’ by a piece in the Guardian.

Yet what is worrying about this story is its’ propensity to attract judgment on the basis of foreign reaction. The movie’s release and broadcast may not necessarily stoke severe social tensions within the Netherlands, but looks bound to provoke an international reaction disproportionate to the issue itself. Religious leaders from Egypt and Syria have demanded the EU take action against those who insult religion, for example, bringing back into focus an increasingly familiar debate of cultural sensitivity versus freedom of speech.

What is undeniable at this point is that the world is indeed watching. They will watch both the provocation as well as the ensuing outrage, which if significant will likely find its source well beyond the borders of the Netherlands. When asked to give one statement on the issue, knowing that many around the world will be listening, Thomas Luijken grinned, and calmly issued perhaps the most pertinent of advice one could give. “Don’t take this man too seriously,” he said, “we really don’t.”

The world is watching. Here’s hoping they see an over hyped controversy for what it truly is.

(Karim blogs over at Outsider On The Inside)