Many spectators of Egypt’s political play this winter believe that they witnessed a revolution. Perhaps so; depending on the definition of “revolution” in your book.

It is laughable to think that a mere 2/80 million, or 1/40 millionth can possibly claim responsibility for ousting an autocrat of thirty years. It is naive to believe so. Mubarak’s leave of power involves a slough of factors–fear of more widespread protest may have been one of them. Revolutions used to happen with at least a majority of the population actively expresses their discontent.

However, it seems like this is one book we should judge by its cover. Egypt ’11 is perceived to be a revolution regardless; it is believed to be “the people toppling the president”. . . this (flawed) perception wields a considerable amount of power.

With the world watching and imagining that a revolution of 2 million people in the street ousted a 30-year-ruler, the perceived power of the masses will, if it already has not, be quite the show to see.

Image borrowed from here.

Which movement that involves less than 25% of a nation is a legitimate revolution? 2 million people protesting on the streets of Egypt–and that is an overestimation–is a noteworthy cause, is a unique show of expression and very interesting in many other ways but it is not anywhere close to even half of the country expressing the desire for anything.

Again, let me reiterate, that I find the show of expression quite the milestone in many ways for the better for Egyptians, but I also know from experience that it is overblown. The Iranian post-election 2009 movements also managed to shock the world, was misnamed a revolution, was expected to be so much more than it turned out to be. (Again I am not denying many noteworthy things that came out of it..) It was indeed not a Twitter revolution, it was not a revolution of any sorts, and today, in 2011, look where the Islamic Republic of Iran stands… not too different from where it stood then–different but not too different.

The issue I have with misrepresentation of this movement in Iran or in Egypt has a very negative consequence for the movement itself, portrayal of something to be something it is not creates reactions that are not appropriate for all parties involved–anti Mubarak and pro Mubarak in this case. Revolutions are fruitful in making significant structural change when they involve at least half if not a majority of a people, if not widespread, these movements are only passionate outbursts of emotion which may result in random extreme reactions-positive or negative-that are not foreseen, or planned for in advance as any successful change requires. & how so very passionate we humans are but how very random the outcome of extremes can be…

For example, Those who are in the streets think they have more power than they do, which may lead them to make risks that will ultimately be stifled because they aren’t after all that powerful. These risks, were they slightly less extreme, may have actually assisted in proper long-term gradual change.

So let’s assume the best over-estimation of people in the streets of Cairo protesting Mubarak to be true… let’s assume that 2 million people are protesting against Mubarak, expressing grievances against Mubarak’s rule, wanting him out or even dead, once we assume that, and look at the numerical data re: Egypt’s population, let’s see what we have: a population of 8.5 million people. 2 million is not even 25% of the people. What do the remaining 75% want.
They may be home because they really don’t mind Mubarak;

They may hate Mubarak’s government but be scared to go out even though the government police have been unexpectedly peaceful toward the people;

They may not be a fan of Mubarak but still remember that thirty years ago, Mubarak was a welcome relief from the turbulence Egypt was at that time;

They may not be a fan of Mubarak but fear that the extremist takeover in Lebenon (hint: hezb…), the established dictatorship in Iran (hint: you got it hezb… and the like), and in many African countries will be the future of Egypt. Once the country has a power vacuum, a fleeing president and vulnerable politics, peer pressure from ill-natured neighboring ideologies can easily seep in.

75% is a considerable majority of the people who are in Egypt, but not out in the streets. What are they thinking?

In the June Presidential elections in Iran we saw ex-president Rafsanjani maneuver the political scene carefully. At first there were rumors of him deciding to run against Ahmadinejad for the second time. Rafsanjani is not traditionally a Reformist. Nor are Pragmatist policies close to the Reformist Camp-especially pre June 2009. However, we saw Rafsanjani indirectly endorsing the reformist camp. Any support he may have had for Mousavi or Karrubi was vague prior to election day, however with the outbreak of protest after the “Velvet Coup,” a series of events merit our attention.

The arrest of Rafsanjani family members in the post-election turmoil was an extremely unpredictable surprise. To put it in perspective for those who may not know the history of Rafsanjani and Iran, arresting his daughter or any restriction on the clan had this going through people’s heads, “Why would the Islamic Republic’s regime punish one of the wealthiest and most heavily vested members of it’s own system? How is it even possible that Rafsanjani, who was a close ally of Khomeini, the leader of the Revolution, be inconvenienced in any way by this regime itself?”

Rafsanjani who is one of the most prominent State politicians in Iran, made an extremely critical speech on July 17th at the Tehran Friday prayers, shortly after the elections. This Friday prayer saw a mass of protesters like other post-election Friday prayers. Some Green Wave protesters were not allowed to enter the area and pray.

Rafsanjani was the residing cleric at this prayer. Regardless of the content of his speech–which did include sensitive attacks and criticism of the Supreme Leadership & Ahmadinejad, the following simple point speak to the leverage Rafsanjani has:

-) For what was perhaps the first time in the history of Islamic Republic, the sermon was not broadcast live on national television.

-)Why was it not broadcaster live? Is it not that the Firday prayers have historically been THE public forum, and THE podium for any socio-political movement, mobilization and activism? The only rationalization for why these prayers were not aired live, is that there were doubts within the government agencies and IRIB as to the content of Rafsanjani’s speech and his allegiance to the ideals of the revolution. This is extremely ironic given that Rafsanjani has historically been one of the IR’s founding fathers.
That Friday’s sermon was broadcast–audio only–later in the evening.

This is one of the most compelling cases in support of Rafsanjani’s leverage against the Supreme Leadership and the government. Be it rooted in age-old rivalry against Khameneie, or in financial corruption, we must recognize this new direction as an influential cause for some effects. Rafsanjani has come out in recent months to publicly attack his fellow teammates and the highest official of a regime he helped found and benefits from. In analyzing the 2009 June Elections as well as the Islamic Republic state infrastructure–or its possible implosion, we must keep deviations by founding fathers like Rafsanjani at the forefront of our analyses and speculation.

The infrastructure in place, in the IR system, for selecting the Supreme Leader was only fully ‎implemented after the death of Khomeini with the purpose to safely sustain the regime during ‎Supreme Leader transitions. Two councils which have the duty to “approve” and “counsel” the ‎Supreme leader were only established after Khamenei. These councils technically have the power to ‎impeach the Supreme Leader, however this is impossible for all practical purposes. ‎
‎1) Those who have made it to the top of this pyramid and have a position on these ‎councils, have been filtered enough to never pose such a threat. ‎
‎2) Should they somehow get that far in the system and change their mind, their life ‎is literally in danger.‎
‎3) The SL, himself, has the power to appoint members to these councils. Clearly, it ‎is not in his interest to appoint members who will oppose him.‎

Who dare speak against the king?

The closest semblance of a threat to the Supreme Leadership’s (Khameneie’s) power in the recent ‎decade, came during the last presidential elections (2005) between Ayatollah Rafsanjani and ‎Ahamadinejad. ‎In the fiasco those elections were, Ayatollah Ali-Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani pioneered public dissent , of sorts but it was dissent anyhow, against the Supreme Leadership by a high-cleric who was himself born and fed by the Regime (!).

(1989-1997)
As a short introduction, Rafsanjani served as president of the Islamic Republic from 1989-1997. He was ‎president during the hardest times Iranians experienced after the revolution. Rebuilding the nation ‎after it went through a revolution and a war was a daunting task. Rafsanjani’s economic policies and ‎proposals are actually noteworthy. At the time, he may have been the only and the best candidate the ‎regime would approve to do the job. (Economists, such as Isfahani, as well as news media acknowledge ‎this.)

As far as civil rights and political repression is concerned, Rafsanjani upheld the ideals of the ‎Revolution quite well—unfortunately. He and his family also made corrupt economic transactions and ‎investments. The Rafsanjani family today is one of the wealthiest families in Iran. It is worth ‎mentioning that, of all the thieving characters this regime has seen, credit should be given to the Rafsanjanis ‎because they seem to be one of the few who do actually invest in Iran. Their investments do maintain ‎and better the lives of citizens and do complement to urbanization projects throughout Iran.

Again, I ‎am not advocating Rafsanjani’s sainthood, nor am I turning a blind eye to his faults/disservice … ‎However, the case still stands that Rafsanjani seems to be the most influential regime authority with ‎the greatest leverage who has, and most certainly, can rise in some sort of dissent while keeping his ‎life safe.‎

(2005 Elections)

Rafsanjani had an obvious lead in the first round of elections. At this time, he repeatedly emphasized, ‎via his press conferences, the close relationship he had with Khomeini in the 70s. He would use this as ‎a justification for his new policy proposals–some of which seemed to question Revolutionary Ideals ‎greatly. Rafsanjani who, in my opinion, is quite the deft politician wanted to completely steer the IR ‎ship towards another direction; this was something that would call for stepping far and beyond the ‎duties (and limits) of a President in this regime. This is also what makes Rafsanjani a pragmatist. He is more pragmatic than he is ideological.

The unexpected nullification of Rafsanjani’s win and ‎call for a re-vote by the Supreme Leadership (SL) in 2005 is justified by some as a defensive move on ‎the Leadership’s behalf. They felt threatened by Rafsanjani. Rafsanjani’s response to SL was instant. ‎His response was a first of its kind in the history of the Islamic Revolution. He publicly questioned not ‎only the SL’s, Khamenei’s, actions re: the election, but he also [dared] question Khamenei’s ‎appointment and legitimacy for the position he holds. This was groundbreaking as far as public ‎discourse of IR officials is concerned.

Rafsanjani repeatedly mentioned that he was in fact more ‎intimate with the deceased Leader Khomeini, than Khamenie was–which is a fact. Relative to ‎Rafsanjani, Khamenei not only lacked in political activism history, he was also not as well read as ‎ayatollah’s usually are. His appointment was made in haste. In the end of the 2005 fiasco, Rafsanjani ‎was appointed a chair position in the Assembly of Experts. This appointment looks more like an ‎attempt to appease, if not set a gag-order, on the rising rebel cleric! ‎

Come back for Part 2 Rafsanjani in the 2009 Presidential Elections